INTRODUCTION
HEN I worked for our local legal services program here in Indiana, we often represented clients who had profound disabilities or severe illnesses, but were unable to obtain the medicine and care they had been prescribed. 1 Our state government provides very limited access to the health insurance program Medicaid, so these clients' applications were routinely rejected.
Once, when one of my colleagues helped a client file an appeal of such a decision, he groaned when the case was assigned to a judge who was known for his outspoken contempt of "welfare." The judge listened to a full hour of evidence about the woman's chronic pain and struggles to afford medication and therapy. Then, he promptly denied her request for Medicaid coverage. The woman left the courtroom in tears.
Her lawyer started packing up his files to leave as well. The judge lingered for a moment, and broke from his stoic demeanor. "It really is too bad what she is going through," he said to my colleague. "Isn't there some kind of program out there to help people like her?" 1 Portions of this article were originally published in Fran Quigley, The Limits of Philanthropy: Time to Eliminate the Charitable Tax Deduction, COMMONWEAL (Jan. 8, 2015) ,https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/limits-philanthropy?utm_content= buffere963d&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campacign=buffer.
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The judge meant a charity program, and the answer is no. The woman was in need of expensive healthcare, not to mention housing and food, and her needs were likely to be permanent. Every free clinic director or homeless shelter staffer I have ever known would tell the judge that their efforts are no substitute for a reliable social safety net, or living wage employment, but that judge is just one of many people who disfavor such government programs.
2 Instead, they possess a comforting belief in a mythical "program out there," a charity that will bridge the gap between grinding poverty and a safe, healthy existence. 3 This view on the effectiveness of charitable programs is a peculiarly American one. Compared to the U.S., other developed countries devote far more government funds to meet social needs. The U.S. spends about 20% of its gross domestic product on government assistance with essentials like healthcare, food, and housing. 4 Most other democratic, marketbased countries spend significantly more. Germany, for example, spends 25% of its GDP on government-provided assistance; the United Kingdom almost 24%. 5 Over the past seventy years, the global community has embraced the idea of the human right to basic life necessities. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, strongly affirms each individual's entitlement to food, medical care, and an adequate standard of living. 6 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESR") followed, creating enforceable rights out of the It is not that Americans are hard-hearted. In contrast to the country's relative stinginess in spending government resources on social needs, its citizens have been singled out for being more charitable than their counterparts in similar nations. 13 On average, Americans donate nearly 2% of their overall income to nonprofit organizations, 14 and over 80% of U.S.
households report making such gifts. 15 As a result, nonprofits are a big part of the U.S. culture and economy. Not only does the United States count on them to meet many social needs that in other countries are provided by the state, nonprofit organizations employ one in every ten members of the U.S. workforce. (1966) . 8 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). The philosopher Isaiah Berlin articulated a difference between civil and political rights, which block the government from taking certain actions against individuals, and economic, social and cultural rights, which require government action, as a contrast between positive and negative liberties. Others have since pointed out that the difference between the two categories of rights is often overstated; see infra note 265 . 9 See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY, 62-86 (2012) (discussing the nature of rights).
10 But see infra note 138 for discussion of economic and social entitlements created by U.S. legislative and state constitutional mandates.
11 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of ICESCR, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. 12 Id. 13 See CHARITIES AND FOUNDATION, WORLD GIVING INDEX 2014 (Nov., 2014),https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/ caf_wgi2014_report_1555awebfinal.pdf ("The U.S is the only country to rank in the Top 10 for all three kinds of giving covered by the World Giving Index: helping a stranger (1st), volunteering time (joint 5th) and donating money (9th).").
14 Suzanne Perry, The Stubborn 2% 
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The prominent role that individual charity plays in the United States is both enduring and celebrated. Famously, Alexis de Tocqueville swooned over the early 19 th century American predilection for forming voluntary organizations. 17 In the years since, the country has created a market-oriented system of providing services via thousands of individual charities funded by discretionary donations. 18 Americans get to vote with their wallets on what kind of support they wish to provide for the poor, an arrangement that has proven to be a good fit for the individualistic culture of the United States. 19 Applause for charity and volunteerism is a staple of U.S. political rhetoric across the ideological spectrum. President George H. W. Bush had his "Thousand Points of Light;" 20 President
Barack Obama promotes "United We Serve." 21 In 1981, President Ronald Reagan explicitly justified a cut in government social spending by appealing to American's preference for voluntary charity:
The truth is that we've let Government take away many things we once considered were really ours to do voluntarily out of the goodness of our hearts and a sense of 17 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 595 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2012) (1835) ("The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society . . . I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object for the exertions of a great many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it."). 18 See Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARTIABLE STATISTICS, http://nccs.urban.org/FAQ/ (In 2012, more than 1.4 million exempt organizations had formally obtained recognition of their tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service. ) . 19 See Stephen L. Carter, Ending Charity Tax Break Will Hurt Poor Most, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-23/ending-charity-tax-break-would-hurtpoor-commentary-by-stephen-l-carter.html (" [T] he individual who gives to charity might measure the needs of the community by different calipers than centralized policy makers, and will therefore contribute to a different set of causes . . . These millions of individual decisions lead to a diversity in spending that would be impossible if we adopted the theory that the only money spent for the public good is the money spent by the state."). 20 See How Volunteering Became a Movement, POINTS OF LIGHT, http://www.pointsoflight.org/about-us ("Cast from the vision of 1,000 points of light shared by our founder President George H. W. Bush in his 1989 inaugural address, today Points of Light transcends politics and borders to inspire millions of volunteers worldwide."). 21 About United We Serve, UNITED WE SERVE, http://www.serve.gov/?q=site-page/about-united-we-serve ("This initiative aims to both expand the impact of existing organizations by engaging new volunteers in their work and encourage volunteers to develop their own 'do-it-yourself' projects.").
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22
But, for the American poor, there is a problem: this myth is no match for reality. Popular confidence in the efficacy of charitable approaches is not supported by the evidence. Private nonprofit programs addressing economic and social needs suffer from insufficient resources, many employ non-professional approaches to providing services, and the sector's work often reflects the wishes of wealthy donors rather than community needs. 23 Despite the country's overall wealth, the United States has higher poverty rates 24 29, 2014) , http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/keyfacts-about-the-uninsured-population/ (noting that 41 million Americans lacked health insurance in 2013, although the implementation of the Affordable Care Act caused the uninsured rate to drop for nonelderly individuals in the first quarter of 2014 by a full percentage point relative to the first quarter of the previous year.). Predictably, the poor in the U.S. also have significantly worse health outcomes than counterparts with higher incomes. See COMMONWEALTH FUND HEALTH CARE IN THE TWO AMERICAS: FINDINGS FROM THE SCORECARD ON STATE HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE FOR LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS (2013) (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ publications/fund-reports/2013/sep/low-income-scorecard ("Lower-income populations are at increased risk of experiencing worse access, lower-quality care-particularly in outpatient settings-and worse health outcomes compared to those with higher incomes in their home state. Income-related disparities were most pronounced on measures of access, prevention, potentially unsafe prescription medication, and health outcomes.").
27 NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 4 (2014), http://nlihc.org/oor/2014 (noting unmet need for 7 million housing units for extremely low-income Americans). 28 Id.; see also FOOD RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, FOOD HARDSHIP IN AMERICA 2012 (Feb. 2013), http://frac.org/pdf/food_hardship_2012.pdf (noting that more than one in six Americans report inability to afford enough food.).
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Many commentators have bemoaned the U.S. imbalance between charity and justice for the poor. 29 But, like the proverbial complaints about the weather, the problem is identified far more often than solutions are posed. This article urges a two-part approach to remedying the charity/justice imbalance in the United States. First, the United States should eliminate the charitable tax deduction. It is a policy that does not effectively address economic and social needs, it forces an inequitable poverty relief and tax burden on the middle class, and it lulls the nation into a false sense of complacency about its poverty crisis. Second, the United States should replace the deduction, an artifact of the charity model, by ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Ratification would be a step toward reversing the American legacy of avoiding an enforceable commitment to economic and social justice.
I. CHARITY AS MORAL SAFETY VALVE
The principle that charity is no substitute for justice substantially predates the 20 th century human rights movement. People of faith can point to ancient religious traditions as the source for a mandate that all humans deserve justice, which includes enforceable rights to basic necessities. Old Testament prophets in particular spoke in terms of justice, with Micah and Amos trying to shake up the complacency of the pious, yet economically stratified 8 th century B.C.E. Israel. 30 In God's name, they issued impassioned commands to, in Amos' words, "let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." 31 Isaiah's mandate to "loose the bonds of wickedness" 32 was the passage that Jesus chose to read to those gathered in the synagogue in the Gospel of Luke.
33
The Quran speaks passionately of justice, 34 and Confucian principles embrace a community-wide obligation to provide for the needs of all.
35 29 See Mike Konczal, The Voluntarism Fantasy, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS (Spring, 2014), http://www.democracyjournal.org/32/the-voluntarismfantasy.php?page=all ("The last 30 years have seen effort after effort to try and push the policy agenda away from the state's capabilities and toward private mechanisms for mitigating the risks we face in the world. This effort is exhausted, and future endeavors will require a greater, not lesser, role for the public.").
30 J, KENNETH KURTZ, THE PEOPLE OF ANCIENT ISRAEL 257 (2009) ("[In the 9 th century B.C.][a]s one decade followed another, the contrasts between rich and poor became even more pronounced in Israel. In the ninth century, the social abuses and sharp economic distinctions of an increasingly stratified society had been of little concern to the monarchy, and by the middle of the eight century such problems were met with complete indifference."). 31 St. Augustine said that charity cannot make up for justice withheld.
36
Evangelical Christian and Sojourners magazine founder Jim Wallis is one of many faith leaders who explains the charity/justice conflict in terms of the parable of babies in the river. 37 If a series of babies are found floating down the river, the community can respond by pulling each one out and caring for them. It would be a pure act of admirable charity, repeated over and over. But it is also incumbent on members of that community to go upstream to remedy the injustice that is causing those babies to be cast into the river in the first place.
38 "All our religious and spiritual traditions focus on how we treat materially poor and excluded people, and suggest that the state of poor people is a moral test for the health of any society," Wallis says. "And those traditions point us beyond mere charity as a response, but call us more prophetically to the deeper solutions of social and economic justice." , http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/love-and-the-apocalypse/jim-wallis-the-commongood-in-a-violent-world. 38 Id. ("Too many people are hauling drowning people out of the river-which is a good thing to do-but not sending somebody upstream to find out who or what's throwing them in. A lot of people are still trying to work with the symptoms and the victimswhich is wonderful and compassionate-but now we need to look at the causes."). 39 Gregor trans., 1964) ("The ability to practice beneficence, which depends on property, follows largely from the injustice of government, which favours certain men and so introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need help. This being the case, does the rich man's help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all?"). 45 Sociologist Janet Poppendieck gave the charity-justice conflict a book-length treatment in 1998's Sweet Charity?, her study of the U.S. system of food pantries and soup kitchens that sprung up as replacements for scaled-back anti-poverty entitlement programs. 50 While praising the many dedicated providers she encountered in her research, Poppendieck concluded that society pays a substantial cost for their kindness. The most obvious cost is assessed at the point of contact, when recipients of charity often feel demeaned, even in settings where donors try to minimize the unavoidable hierarchy of benevolence. 51 Catholic nun Sister Peggy Flanagan, a volunteer at a Salvation Army hot meal program, said, paraphrasing St. Vincent de Paul, "When you feed the poor, please ask for their forgiveness. You are giving them a bowl of soup, but they give up their dignity." 52 As any mother forced to line up for help from the community food pantry can tell you, it truly is better to give than to receive.
Poppendieck identifies far broader damage flowing from the U.S. culture's preference for charity over rights. When a large majority of Americans report that they donate or volunteer for charity, it is not just a symptom of a society where the poor are forced to scramble for donated goods. It is a cause of that suffering as well. "The growth of kindness and the decline in justice are intimately interrelated," Poppendieck writes. "This massive charitable endeavor serves to relieve pressure for more fundamental solutions."
53
Poppendieck extends the metaphor to argue that broad participation in-and awareness of-charitable efforts act as a "moral safety valve."
54
Participating in a walk-a-thon for the homeless or donating a box of macaroni and cheese to the community food drive allows many Americans to avoid confronting the immorality of a society where great wealth ex-
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Poppendieck characterizes most charitable efforts as unintentionally distracting rather than intentionally masking the problems of inequality. 56 But other commentators point out that most comparatively wealthy charitable donors would not be displeased to know that donations from their excess help to perpetuate an unequal system that has richly rewarded them.
57
There is also the undeniable reality that, for many concerned and compassionate Americans, it is simply preferable to be engaged in hands-on service as opposed to traveling the long, circuitous, and often frustrating path of activism for justice. As a physician who founded a Washington, D.C. community for homeless men with HIV/AIDS writes, "For most of us, the work of advocacy is less rewarding than day-today contact with needy people. It is less direct. As an advocate, I may never see significant change; I would rather immerse myself in direct service. And so the desperately needed work of advocacy is left undone."
58
For heroes like these who devote their lives to charitable works, their exposure to unmet need deprives them of the luxury of avoidance. In her research, Poppendieck interviewed scores of operators and volunteers at emergency food programs, most of whom were quite aware of the limitations of the charity model in which they were immersed. 59 Many antihunger leaders told Poppendieck that they feel trapped by the need to 55 Id. at 198-99. See also C.S. LEWIS, YOURS, JACK: SPIRITUAL GUIDANCE FROM C.S. LEWIS 119 (2008) (Lewis is among those who have given voice to the notion that private charity can excuse a citizen from concerns over suffering they do not witness first-hand: "I think each village was meant to feel pity for its own sick and poor whom it can help and I doubt if it is the duty of any private person to fix his mind on ills which he cannot help. This may even become an escape from the works of charity we really can do to those we know. 56 POPPENDIECK, supra note 51, at 301-02. 57 Satyajit Das, Philanthropy Is Not Just Charity from the Rich: It's Self-Serving, Independent, (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/business/comment/philanthropy-is-not-just-charity-from-the-rich-its-selfserving-9927181.html("[Philanthropy by the wealthy] is an exercise in damage control against any backlash by the less well-off. Its perspectives are self-serving, promoting views beneficial to the business and financial interests of the wealthy. . . .The paradox of philanthropy is that enrichment by various [harmful] means paves the way for conspicuous generosity."); David Hilfiker, Justice and the Limits of Charity, DavidHilfiker.com (Sept.-Oct., 2000), http://www.davidhilfiker.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=13:limits-of-charity&catid=8:justice-essays&Itemid=17 ("Charity does little to change the wider social and political systems that sustain injustice. In fact, most charities depend heavily on the very volunteers, individual donors, and institutions that have prospered under the current systems. And people who have done well in a system are usually not interested in changing it drastically-in fact, they may be diametrically opposed."). 58 Hilfiker, supra note 58. 59 POPPENDIECK, supra note 51, at 289.
50
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 23:1 address the direct suffering caused by a shredded safety net, and to promote the value of their own programs to donors. 60 One rabbi who helped found a New York City soup kitchen told Poppendieck that she discourages people who seek to follow her path, urging them instead to look for opportunities to be an advocate for systemic change. 61 But those who, like the rabbi, tackle the significant challenge of direct charity work often do not have the time to serve as advocates for justice. Consumed with the task of pulling the babies out of the river, they have no spare energy for a venture upstream for advocacy. It is a dilemma Poppendieck cites as one of the opportunity costs of the U.S. charitable model.
II. ELIMINATE THE U.S. CHARITABLE TAX DEDUCTION
A. An Inequitable Reward for the Wealthy
The United States' uniquely high level of reliance on a charitable response to poverty is not just an artifact of culture or history. It is an approach formally sanctioned by government policy expressed in its most tangible manifestation: the tax code. 63 Since 1917, U.S. law has allowed individuals, corporations, and estates to deduct as much as half of their annual taxable income in an amount equal to charitable gifts made to qualified nonprofit organizations. 64 The "501(c)(3)" organizations that are eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts include charitable, religious, educational, and sports groups, among others. 65 This U.S. tax deduction provides the most generous incentive for charitable giving of any developed nation. 66 As economist Joseph Schumpeter said over a half-century ago, "Nothing shows so clearly the character of a society and of a civilization as does the fiscal policy that its political sector adopts." 67 60 Id. 61 
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The most obvious effect of this policy is a loss of tax revenue. 68 For a U.S. taxpayer at the highest marginal rate of 39.6%, every dollar in charitable contributions reduces their tax obligation by nearly 40 cents.
69
The estimated annual cost of charitable tax deductions is $40 billion in lost revenue, 70 an amount more than three times the annual federal budget for the program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). 71 The deduction thus acts to transfer money-and poweraway from democratically elected government and hand them to individual donors.
The resulting nonprofit sector funded by these tax-deductible gifts has been called "the hidden welfare state."
72 But it is the kind of welfare state that government-mistrusting Americans can live with, Yale law professor Stephen Carter has written. "The [charitable] deduction is democracy in action," Carter says.
73
Except that it isn't. The nonprofit sector is radically elitist in that it places decision-making power firmly in the hands of our country's most wealthy residents.
74 By definition, the rich possess the most disposable income and can afford to donate more than others of lesser means.
75
That disproportionate control over the nonprofit sector, sometimes referred to as a "plutocratic bias," is further buttressed by two characteristics of the charitable tax deduction. tions. 77 They get no tax benefit from their charity. Second, even the minority of modest-income donors who do claim charitable tax deductions benefit less from their gifts than do more wealthy donors since wealthy donors' tax rates are higher.
78
The result is a skewed reward system. Three-quarters of the tax money saved via charitable deductions goes to donors with annual incomes over $500,000, even though these people's donations total just a little more than half of all charitable gifts. 79 U.S. taxpayers with incomes under $50,000 gave 20% of all charitable donations, but benefitted from only 5% of the total deduction subsidy.
80
The fundamentally inequitable nature of the charitable tax subsidy is illustrated by Charles Clotfelter, a Duke University economist who has written extensively on U.S. tax policy. Noting that Americans of more modest means tend to donate most to religious organizations, Clotfelter points to a hypothetical fundraising effort to put a new steeple on a Methodist church in Kansas. 81 The $50,000 raised for the steeple comes from smaller individual donations by parishioners who, like most Americans, do not itemize their tax deductions. 82 No government revenue was lost by this effort. But the wealthiest Americans favor higher education with their gifts, and they are sure to itemize their deductions. 83 So, Clotfelter notes, a comparable $50,000 donation to the Stanford University athletics department by a high-income donor would have a very different effect. 84 The gift would be de facto subsidized by other U. 
2016]
Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 53 the amount of $17,500, the tax that a wealthy donor in the 35% bracket avoided paying by making the gift.
85
The nonprofit sector is not just profoundly un-democratic, it also fails to produce anything resembling a "hidden welfare state"-at least a welfare state that would benefit those most in need. The legal parameters for organizations eligible for the 501(c)(3) designation are quite broad, meaning that tax-deductible gifts can go to support college football teams, opera companies, and rare bird sanctuaries just as easily as they can be directed toward domestic violence shelters. 86 Historically, highincome donors have shown a preference for gifts to higher education, health, and the arts. 87 The majority of donations given by Americans are to religious organizations, which direct only about 5% of those gifts to social services. 88 Despite the charitable tax deduction defenders' insistence that "the social good of the deduction far outweighs the money it costs," 89 it turns out that a quite limited amount of U.S. donations have the effect of transferring resources from rich Americans to poorer ones.
90 Some tax- Most Americans do not know this. The charitable model is singularly well-marketed in the United States, as warm public service announcements and glossy annual reports trumpet how well nonprofits meet the community's needs. 92 These efforts have succeeded, with a clear majority of Americans reporting a belief that nonprofits are better at promoting social welfare than government programs. 93 And rising levels of economic segregation mean that non-poor Americans are rarely confronted by the realities of poverty. 94 American Enterprise Institute president Arthur Brooks, writing earlier this year in the magazine Commentary, directly addressed conservative Americans in an effort to puncture any illusions of charity's impact.
95 "It would be wonderful if America could solve all its problems of poverty and need through private charity," he wrote. "But even in this remarkably charitable country…private donations cannot guarantee anywhere near the level of assistance that vast majorities of Americans across the political spectrum believe is our moral duty." 96 The absence of a meaningful anti-poverty impact from donated dollars is particularly discouraging when compared to the opportunity lost due to tax revenue that could have been spent on proven government assistance programs like food stamps, unemployment compensation and housing assistance. 97 Even in their underfunded condition here in the United States, such programs are more efficient than comparable charity efforts, and are credited with lifting more than 40 million people out of poverty each year. 
B. Exposing the Charity Illusion
In support of a local effort to raise the minimum wage, I sometimes give talks to service organizations and community groups. 99 As part of the presentation, I outline the daily challenges faced by the low-income workers we serve in our law school clinic. 100 For example, I often talk about a local hotel housekeeper who gets down on her hands and knees each day to scrub other people's toilets, but cannot afford health insurance for herself. 101 She earns so little that it can be a struggle to keep food on the family table. The hotel worker is perpetually on the verge of eviction and homelessness, and she has her already meager paycheck garnished to pay off healthcare and housing debts.
102
After these talks, I can count on at least one person to approach me with a particular question. He sees no need to raise her wages. In fact, he is puzzled by the housekeeper's struggles. "Why," he asks, "can't she just go to a food pantry?" By this time, others have usually gathered around the questioner, and they nod their heads. They have been wondering the same thing.
This enduring American delusion owes its existence in part to the U.S. charitable tax deduction. The deduction is an elitist, ineffective policy creation that harms the poor and forces an inequitable burden on the middle class. Worse, the deduction lulls the nation into a false sense of complacency about our poverty crisis. 103 It is time to eliminate it. The working class should not be subject to greater tax obligations to compensate for a wealthy citizen's charitable donation that already brought the donor "credit and notoriety," Gladstone argued.
107
Eliminating the charitable tax deduction would lead to billions in increased tax revenue each year. 108 For example, that revenue could be directed to pre-school education for poor children instead of a college stadium suite with a donor's name on a plaque over the door.
109 Even more importantly, eliminating the charitable deduction would allow for a long overdue reckoning with our country's crisis of inequality.
110 It would destroy the illusion that discretionary charity diverted from the excess accumulated by our nation's wealthy constitutes either an ethical or effective societal response to hunger, homelessness, and illness. The moral safety valve provided by tax-deductible charity should be shut off.
111
An illustration of the charity illusion was provided in the 2012 discussion of lowering the charitable tax deduction-it survived that year's budget debate intact-when a lobbyist for the nonprofit sector defended the deduction in a newspaper column. 112 As an illustration of the deduc- The characteristic flaws of a charitable response to social crises-a lack of coordination among hundreds of isolated nonprofit efforts, the elevation of donor interests and non-profit visibility over the needs of those to be served-are on full, painful display in still-struggling Port-au-Prince today. 116 Yet, it is likely that most 2010 U.S. donors to Haitian relief feel that, due in part to their generosity, Haitians' needs were effectively addressed. 117 The poor continue to suffer; the donors have moved on. This is the inherent dynamic of the charitable model.
None of this is to say that the U.S. nonprofit sector does not have value. Acts of discretionary compassion can, and should supplement a broad system that guarantees each individual her right to the essentials of life.
118 Small-scale charitable programs can provide valuable examples of innovation, developing methods that improve the comprehensive systems that address social needs.
119 Similar benefits from private efforts can be found on an individual level. Volunteerism and donations can provide the first-hand exposure to inequality and suffering that moves a charity-focused individual to become an advocate for justice. Persons 120 Bill Gates' experience making historically large charitable donations led him to embrace the role of champion for government-funded health programs and tax equity.
121
So it is heartening to realize that eliminating the charitable tax deduction would not doom the U.S. nonprofit sector. Evidence over time shows that donations appear to be tied more to a rise in wealth rather than the tax treatment of gifts. 122 The giving from modest-income donors who do not itemize currently ill be unaffected by eliminating the deduction they do not benefit from. 123 As for the wealthy, there is a vigorous debate about the importance of the charitable deduction on decisions to donate. 124 
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Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 59 turns out that the same intrinsic rewards that motivate Americans to volunteer, such as the desire to give back to the community and to set an example for others, act to inspire donations as well. 126 Along with more external benefits such as recognition in the community, these rewards have a far greater impact on giving than tax policies do. 127 No less of a philanthropist than Warren Buffett says that tax implications are irrelevant to the charity decisions of the significantly wealthy. 128 However, it would be naïve to pretend that eliminating the charitable tax deduction would have no negative impact on the U.S. nonprofit sector. 129 On balance, though, that is not a bad thing. If the deduction goes away, it is likely there would be a downsizing of charitable institutions. Their hierarchical benefactor-recipient model would be less prevalent, as would their heavily marketed messages designed to convince potential donors that the needs of the poor are far better covered than they are in reality. 130 Stripped of these illusions, compassionate Americans would join their counterparts in similar nations and support strengthening government-operated institutions that respect all humans as holders of enforceable rights, rather than holders of a beggar's cup. 131 The vacuum created by the elimination of the charitable tax deduction should be filled by the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
III. U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
The second stage of the proposed remedy for the U.S. imbalance between justice and charity is the replacement of the charitable tax deduction with the long-delayed U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 132 Ratification of the ICESCR would profoundly reshape the nation's approach to addressing the needs of all Americans. 2012),http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/files/press_kit/additional/2012_BAC_Study_ of_High_Net_Worth_Philanthropy_0.pdf (49.9% of high net worth households said their giving would be unaffected if the charitable deduction was eliminated, less than 10% said it would dramatically decrease. The highest proportion (74%) of high net worth donors reported giving to charity because "they were moved at how their gift could make a difference."). 126 See id.; Dan Kadlec, Why Limiting the Charity Tax Deduction Won't Destroy Charities, TIME (Dec. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/12/07/why-limiting-the-charity-taxdeduction-wont-destroy-charities/ (reporting survey results where less than 13% of donors say they are motivated by tax deductions). 127 Id. 
A. History of Economic and Social Rights
The notion of individuals possessing certain economic and social rights existed long before there were international treaties and institutions designed to define and protect those rights. As noted above, all major religious traditions, and virtually all philosophical approaches, articulate a mandate to provide for the needs of the poor and sick, and most have done so using language that invokes justice and rights, not mere charity. 133 Many individual governments have long embraced a responsibility to provide food and shelter for the indigent, as evidenced by provisions in the 18 th century Prussian General Code, the 19 th century Norwegian Constitution, multiple French constitutions, the social insurance programs of late 19 th century Germany, and U.S. poor relief systems from the same era. 134 In the early 20 th century, the constitutions of Mexico, the Soviet Union, and the Weimar Republic all articulated a governmental obligation to address economic and social needs. 135 On the multilateral level, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 created the International Labour Organization ("ILO"), which eventually adopted standards regarding child labor, work hours, and insurance in the event of injury, illness, and old age. 136 In the United States, state constitutions adopted in the 19 th and 20 th centuries often included rights to education, and some articulated rights to health and general welfare. 137 Beginning in the 19 th century, states implemented poor relief programs. 138 In the 1930's, New Deal legislation created ambitious and successful federal social programs designed to counteract the effects of the Great Depression, including social security and unemployment insurance and multiple efforts that provided government-paid employment to supplement family incomes. 139 These pro-
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President Franklin Roosevelt sought to build on the success of that legislation, and the impending end of World War II, in his 1944 State of the Union address, where he laid out an agenda he called a "second Bill of Rights":
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. "Necessitous men are not free men." People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education. 
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All of these rights spell security. And after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being.
141
Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights followed his 1941 State of the Union address outlining the Four Freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. 142 Both of these Roosevelt speeches' embrace of economic and social rights animated the deliberations of the new United Nations, as it considered the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), which is demonstrated by a June 1947 U.S. draft of the Declaration that included significant support for economic and social rights. 143 Roosevelt's widow, Eleanor Roosevelt, served as the first U.S. representative to the UN Human Rights Commission, and chaired the Commission and the committee that drafted the UDHR. 144 She largely joined in the support for the Declaration's Articles 22 through 28, which include the rights to social security, unemployment protection, an adequate standard of living, and free primary education. 145 On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration without a dissenting vote. 146 Together with its two implementing treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ICESCR, the three documents are considered to constitute the International Bill of Rights.
147
B. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The ICESCR articulates the right to social security; 148 the right to free primary education; 149 the right to work, including the right to remu- The Covenant's Article 2 places qualifications on a state's immediate obligations, allowing it to "take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources" to eventually "achieve progressively the full realization of the rights" in the Covenant. 156 The inclusion of such broad rights under an abstract mandate like "progressive realization" led to the creation, in 1985, of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the ESCR Committee. 157 The Committee is made up of 18 independent expert members, hailing from different geographical regions and serving four-year terms. 158 The Committee reviews reports that state parties to the Covenant are required to submit within two years of ratifying the Covenant, and every five years thereafter. 159 The reports outline the states' compliance with the Covenant, including the steps taken toward the promised "full realization" of the enumerated economic and social rights. 160 As is the case in other human rights treaty reporting processes, the ESCR Committee is often best informed by critiques of the party state's compliance submitted by non-governmental organizations (NGO's) or other advocates. 161 162 Under the Optional Protocol, state parties may also agree to allow the Committee to make more general inquiries and recommendations on "grave or systematic violations" of the Convention.
163
The Committee also issues General Comments, which have proven to be instrumental in clarifying states' duties under the Covenant. 164 In particular, the Committee addressed "The Nature of State Parties' Obligations" in General Comment 3 in 1990, articulating a "minimum core" that has given shape to the broad outlines of the economic and social obligations owed to individuals:
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States parties' reports the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State party to take the necessary steps "to the maximum of its available resources." In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations. 165 The Committee's General Comments have also provided specific guidelines for compliance with many of the Covenant's provisions, including education ("The nature of this [free primary education] requirement is unequivocal."-Comment 11, 1999 166 ) and housing ("the right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense . . . it should be seen as the right to somewhere live in security, peace, and dignity."-Comment 4, 1991 167 ). The Committee has also employed the Comments process to refute any perception that the Covenant requires a socialist system of government: "[The Covenant does not demand] any particular form of government or economic system being used as the vehicle for the steps in question, provided only that it is democratic and that all human rights are thereby respected . . . ." 168 The ICESCR is far from being the only international legal instrument recognizing economic and social rights. In the decades since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most countries that have written new constitutions have included the rights to social security, food, health care, and housing. 169 The ILO Conventions, 170 the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 171 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 172 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 173 all reference a range of economic and social rights. The same is true for regional human rights treaties, including the African Charter on Human 66
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176
In fact, the global response to poverty, suffering, and inequality is increasingly framed in the language of human rights. 177 Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson said, "I am often asked what is the most serious form of human rights violations in the world today, and my reply is consistent: extreme poverty."
178 The Vienna Declaration of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights stated, "[T]he existence of widespread extreme poverty inhibits the full and effective enjoyment of human rights." 179 Nelson Mandela said that "[M]assive poverty and obscene inequality are such terrible scourges of our times-times in which the world boasts breathtaking advances in science, technology, industry, and wealth accumulation-that they have to rank alongside slavery and apartheid as social evils."
180 Seventy years after Franklin Roosevelt made the case that economic and social needs are in fact rights deserving of fulfillment, that recognition has become the global norm-with the notable exception of Roosevelt's own United States of America.
C. The United States and Economic and Social Rights
Unlike most national constitutions, and the vast majority of constitutions adopted after World War II, the U.S. Constitution contains no explicit guarantees of economic or social rights. As Judge Richard Posner has written, "The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that the federal government might do too little for the people, but that it might do too much for them." 181 The rights protected under the U.S. 174 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (including the rights to health, work, and education in arts. 15-17). 175 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, opened for signature Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (including rights to fair remuneration for work, art. 4, and social security, art. 12). 
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Constitution fall almost exclusively into the civil and political rights category, with even the Constitution's protections against governmentsanctioned discrimination given a more limited interpretation than international law generally calls for.
182
For a time in the mid-20 th century, it appeared that the U.S. Supreme Court may read into the Constitution implicit guarantees of economic and social rights. 183 In 1954, a unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of Education cited education as a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of all rights as a citizen. 184 The Court later struck down new-resident waiting periods for welfare benefits 185 and ruled that the Due Process Clauses' protection of property interests encompassed welfare payments. 186 In the latter case, Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court even quoted the Constitution's preamble when delivering a constitutional affirmation of the value of justice over charity:
[W]elfare . . . can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. . . Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." 187 But the Court would go no further down the path toward enforceable economic and social rights. In 1973, the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez rejected the notion of a federal constitutional right to education, 188 and on multiple other occasions reaffirmed that most social and economic legislative classifications are immune from constitutional challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. 189 The Court aggressively rejected an argument of implicit economic and social constitutional rights in the case of Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, ruling that the "Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 68 " 190 Ultimately, when the U.S. executive and legislative branches in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century tore holes in the safety net once provided by welfare and food programs, there was no constitutional barrier protecting the poor from these devastating decisions by the political branches of government.
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Nor were those legislative and executive actions barred by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as the United States is the only western democracy to have failed to ratify the Covenant. 192 In 1966, under President Lyndon Johnson's administration, the United States voted in the UN General Assembly to adopt the Covenant. 193 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed the Covenant and submitted it to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 194 But, although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights achieved Senate approval and was ratified by the United States in 1992, the Senate has never taken up the ICESCR and no presidential administration since Carter's has asked the Senate to do so. 195 The lack of a federal constitutional or treaty obligation to honor economic and social rights does not mean such rights are completely foreign to U.S. approaches to domestic or international policy. As noted above, many state constitutions articulate rights to education, and some include language outlining a state government commitment to general welfare and public health.
196 Some state courts have seized on these provisions, and the federal constitution's reservation of power to the states through the Tenth Amendment, to find enforceable economic and social rights for
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Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 71 flect a broader U.S. discomfort with economic and social rights. 212 One argument against ratifying the ICESCR in the United States is that the treaty's obligations placed on the national government would contradict the U.S. legacy under the Tenth Amendment of granting to individual states the power to devise and implement economic and social programming. 213 This federalism objection had an undeniably racist tint in the Bricker Amendment era-southern states did not want antidiscrimination treaty provisions to interfere with their Jim Crow practices. 214 The extent of states' current autonomy in the economic and social arena eighty years after the New Deal is certainly debatable. 215 But the federalism legacy in the United States retains a strong presence in public dialogue, especially when coupled with state constitutional provisions for economic and social rights. 216 An even more deep-seated source of U.S. resistance to the ICESCR is its association with the collectivist philosophies of communism and socialism. 217 Although the Cold War between capitalist and communist states is long concluded, the United States continues to define itself internally, and internationally, as an individualistic culture. 218 In a country where "Don't Tread on Me" flags and bumper stickers are still quite prevalent, 219 and a Tea Party anti-government movement has had significant political impact in the 21 st century, 220 the limited-government character 212 The U.S. has been slow to embrace even civil and political rights, as evidenced by its delayed ratification of the ICCPR and its history of attaching reservations, understandings, and declarations to the treaties it does ratify. See Harold Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin's Human Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 490 (2007) . ("In the cathedral of human rights, the United States is more like a flying buttress than a pillar--choosing to stand outside the international structure supporting the international human rights system, but without being willing to subject its own conduct to the scrutiny of that system."). 213 Hollis, supra note 202. 214 The United States' ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which largely tracks the guarantees in the U.S. Constitution, is instructive. Even some staunch human rights advocates explicitly or implicitly elevate civil and political rights over economic and social rights. Aryeh Neier, a leading U.S. human rights activist who has directed Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union, and served as president of the Open Society Institute, argues that a more just distribution of the world's resources cannot come from assertion of human rights. 226 In fact, Neier and others believe that the necessarily uncertain markers gauging progressive realization of economic and social rights could lead to a watering down of civil and political rights:
With social and economic rights . . . it is inevitable that they are going to be applied differently in different placWould Overhaul Medicaid, Cnn Money (Aug. 13, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/13/news/economy/ryan-medicaid/ (Rep. Paul Ryan, the Republican candidate for Vice President in 2012, saying the social welfare safety net is at risk of becoming "a hammock that lulls able-bodied people into lives of dependency and complacency, that drains them of their will and their incentive to make the most of their lives."). 221 See Neier, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that economic rights do not have their roots in "Natural Law" as civil and political rights do). But see note 192 supra (demonstrating that the ICESCR has been ratified by most capitalistic democracies, including all of the U.S.' closest economic allies in western Europe. es. That is, if you are talking about one country with extensive resources and one that is very poor, there is not going to be the same right to shelter or to health care. . . . But suppose that one takes that same idea -that different stages of development mean different things for each country -and applies it to the concept of civil and political rights. Suppose China or Zimbabwe says it is not a developed country and therefore cannot provide the same civil and political rights as a developed country . . . Therefore, I think it is dangerous to allow this idea of social and economic rights to flourish . . .
227
Human Rights Watch is now openly advocating for economic and social rights, 228 and Amnesty International also argues for economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights. 229 But their advocacy in the economic and social rights arena is comparatively less robust, and Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth has confessed to "a sense of futility" among traditional civil and political rights advocates making their way in the promotion of economic and social rights. sions of horror and outrage . . . In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations of civil and political rights continue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently intolerable, than massive and direct denials of economic, social and cultural rights . . .
231
In its struggle to enforce economic and social rights as vigorously as civil and political rights, the United States is clearly not alone.
3. Economic and social rights are not justiciable
As the statements of Neier and other advocates suggest, one source of their preference for civil and political rights is that those rights are seen to be justiciable in a way economic and social rights are not. As Neier has stated, The concern that I have with economic and social rights is when there are broad assertions of the sort that appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or that appear in the South African Constitution, which speak broadly of a right to shelter or housing, a right to education, a right to social security, a right to a job, and a right to health care. There, I think, we get into territory that is unmanageable through the judicial process and that intrudes fundamentally into an area where the democratic process ought to prevail.
232
The argument that economic and social rights are "unmanageable through the judicial process," and thus not justiciable, can be reduced to two points: courts do not possess the legitimacy or the competency to adjudicate economic and social rights.
The legitimacy argument asserts, as Neier's statement suggests, that the judiciary is not the correct branch of government to be making decisions involving economic and social rights. 233 A democratically-elected legislature and executive, with more transparent deliberative processes and direct accountability to the electorate are the proper bodies to be reaching decisions on economic and social matters. 234 A judge-issued ruling on an alleged economic and social rights violation risks the possibility of "queue jumping," since the issue is presented to the court with-231 Comm. on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights on Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, U.N. Doc E/1993/22, Ann. III, at 83 (1999). 232 Neier, supra note 226. 233 See Neier, supra note 9, at 83 ("Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers famously called the judiciary the 'least dangerous' branch of government because it has 'neither the power of the purse nor the power of the sword.'"). 234 If the courts do consider the broader economic and social landscape, the argument goes, there would be virtually no limit to their jurisdiction. As one scholar has written about adjudication of economic and social rights, "In the end, we would have the courts running everything-raising taxes and deciding how the money should be spent."
236
Concerns are also lodged about courts overstepping not just their political legitimacy, but also exceeding the boundaries of their competency. 237 The worry is that economic and social rights are too complex, costly, and vague for judges to appropriately enforce. 238 Courts lack taxing authority, along with the depth of knowledge and breadth of available interventions that are available to a bureaucracy. 239 Confronted by these challenges, scholars have predicted, courts will limit themselves to a position of deference to the political branches. 240 There are certainly examples of just that sort of judicial deference, including English Court of Appeals and South African Constitutional Court decisions that allowed the political branches to determine the scope of the right to health care. 241 In the case of R v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B, involving a request to mandate the state-run health services to provide cancer treatment to a girl despite its low probability of success, the court wrote, "Difficult and agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. While it is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a strategy to push the United States toward ratification of the ICESCR, 243 there is no question that ratification of the Covenant would be a transformative event in the evolution of the political and moral character of the United States. 244 Human rights instruments are normative, meaning they create a set of expectations designed to spur governmental and societal behavior. 245 The process of public discussions, official deliberations and eventual ratification of human rights treaties is sometimes compared to a cascade that eventually leads to better conditions for affected persons. 246 Recent empirical research has confirmed widespread achievement of the normative goals of human rights treaties: improvements in the respect for, and protection of, human rights in countries that ratify the instruments. 247 While full compliance with the ICESCR among its current 243 Although there is a clear need for a modern and considered articulation of that strategy, blueprints for ratification efforts have been offered by scholars. See Alston 
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Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 77 parties is far from a reality, certain of its rights-including the right to primary school education and some food, housing, and labor rights-are widely respected. 248 The efficacy of human rights treaty instruments is derived not just from the language of rights but from the forums provided for asserting those rights and registering complaints when they have not been respected. 249 The ESCR Committee has stated that a forum and access to remedies for rights violations are necessary for compliance with the Covenant. 250 As Nolan, et al. have written, the process of formal "witness" has a special power to push the needle toward a greater respect for human rights: "Most people who have participated in human rights hearings at the domestic or regional level will have experienced a kind of pivotal moment in the adjudication of a human rights claim when, through the 'voice' of the rights claimant, the subjective struggle for dignity and security breaks through the legal argument to bring home the real issues of human dignity that are at stake in a claim." 251 The United States' lack of a strong history of respecting economic and social rights provides a strong rationale for-not against-the adoption of the ICESCR, especially when viewed in the context of an unsatisfactory status quo: enduring and widespread U.S. poverty. 252 U.S. exceptionalism in the economic and social rights arena is evidenced by the text of the U.S. constitution, the narrow judicial interpretation of that constitution in the context of economic and social rights, and the refusal to
Proposal for Remedying Charity/Justice Imbalance 79 tence of democracy is no guarantee of full economic and social rights. 259 As professor Frances Stewart has said, "Capitalist democratic states put the emphasis on the private sector, which does not always deliver on social goods. The free press is good on major disasters like classic famines, but it tolerates chronic hunger as much as anyone else." 260 Stated in a more positive way, democracy and economic and social rights are interdependent. 261 Recognizing this interdependency, western democracies other than the United States embrace economic and social rights alongside similar civil and political rights commitments in their constitutions, their court decisions, and in their ratification of both the ICESCR and ICCPR. 262 It is no coincidence that, compared to the United States, these same nations devote a greater percentage of their gross domestic product to meeting social needs, have lower poverty rates, and endure less inequality. 263 
Economic and Social Rights are Justiciable in the United States
In terms of justiciability, the two forms of rights also resist neat division. The standard Isaiah Berlin characterization of civil and political rights as negative rights and economic and social rights as positive rights has some broad validity, 264 but it is inaccurate to say that the state does not incur substantial obligations in the protection of civil and political rights. A partial list of the substantial governmental undertakings to protect civil and political rights in the United States and elsewhere would include criminal courts, civil courts, jails and prisons, police officer hiring and training, government systems for recording and protecting private property, and extensive election apparatus. 265 Although it has been It is possible that the political branches of the U.S. government will reliably protect economic and social rights post-ratification of the ICESCR, especially with the intervention of civil society pushing for such protections. 274 But the influence of campaign contributions and lobbying by wealthy individual and corporate supporters, 275 along with non-representative legislative apportionment due to electoral district gerrymandering, 276 calls into question the political branches' reliability in protecting economic and social rights. Deval Desai argues that the judiciary has a role to play in the interpretation and enforcement of economic and social rights when the other branches of government are not truly representative of the polity due to the limited agency of those living in grinding poverty. 277 Devai focuses his analysis on developing countries, but notes that the need for judicial oversight of economic and social rights in the United States is suggested by the sheer percentage of the population living below the poverty line and without essentials such as healthcare. 278 Similarly, arguments that courts lack competency to adjudicate economic and social rights do not account for the adversarial legal process' ability to produce robust fact-finding and generate creative and effective remedies. 279 In the judicial setting, expert witnesses, documentary evidence, amicus curiae (friend of the court) and third-party interveners, along with courts' capacity to appoint special masters and other expert adjudicators, all supplement the testimony of the directly-affected individuals and the arguments of counsel challenging every factual and legal 82
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[Vol. 23:1 contention. 280 As a result, advocates litigating economic and social rights find that judicial review brings out information and analysis that were not present in the political branch process. 281 Any complaint that economic and social rights in the United States are vague compared to civil and political rights would be remedied by judicial interpretation of the Covenant on challenges brought by individuals and civil society, just as decades of case law has given shape to the abstract notions of privacy rights, due process, and other constitutional liberty considerations. 282 Indeed, studies have shown that courts reviewing economic and social rights in other jurisdictions effectively balanced factors like resource limitations, popular demand, and infrastructure concerns. 283 As that track record suggests, the question of courts' competency to adjudicate economic and social rights is no longer a timely one. The matter is now well-settled, with courts and commissions reviewing claims and issuing orders regarding the right to clean water in Argentina, 284 289 to name just a few of dozens of examples. 290 Professor Lucy Williams conducted an analysis of thirty two economic and social rights decisions from eight national jurisdictions and found the courts sometimes aggressively ordering the provision of social goods and "[m]uch less preoccupied with [separation of powers] concerns than academics and traditional jurists in the older constitutional democracies may imagine." 291 Any notion that economic and social rights are a mere paper tiger were put to rest long ago, as evidenced in particular by sweeping decisions by courts in India and South Africa.
In the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India was presented with claims based on the Indian government retaining a food surplus even as its citizens were suffering from a severe famine. 292 Citing Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which protects every citizen's right to live with human dignity, the Court ordered the government to carry out food and employment programs, including school meals and provision of grain at reduced prices to impoverished families.
293 Implementation of the orders, which involved millions of tons of grain and the expenditure of billions of rupees, was overseen by court-appointed commissioners. 294 The court's ruling and implementation is considered to have saved thousands of lives. 295 As one commentator observed about the Indian case and a Colombian Constitutional Court's orders for health care and housing for displaced persons, "In both cases, the court took on massive issues that the political branches had basically ignored and constructed public policy from the ground up." 296 The South African Constitutional Court has generated a body of law on economic and social rights that illustrates both the rights' justiciability and the Court's exercise of restraint by leaving some decisions to the political branches of government. The Court's most celebrated decision, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, relied on the right to healthcare services articulated in the South African Constitution to compel the government to provide the anti-retroviral medicine nevirapine to
